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Nature of Proceedings

This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment by which the
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby dismissed the matter without trial,
and

allowed

Holt

to

rescind

her

contract

obligations

requested in her counterclaim.
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as

Statement of Issues on Appeal

I.

Did

the trial court err in granting summary

judgment, when the parties dispute (1) whether timely, proper
approval from Mr. Holt was necessary and was received, and (2)
whether the earnest money check was dishonored?
II. Was it proper to base summary judgment on Holt's
hearsay statement that bank employees told her by telephone that
the check would not be good if deposited?
III.

Did the court err in finding a "failure of

consideration" based upon the alleged inability to cash the
earnest money check?
IV.

Was it error to base summary judgment on an

alleged "violation of the Statute of Frauds", and was there such
a "violation"?
V.

Is Holt bound by her oral agreement to close the

purchase a day later than the one provided in the earnest money
agreement?

Determinative Authorities

Appendix A hereto are copies of the following:
Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1, Utah Code (1974); §
25-5-8, Utah Code (1943).

- 6 -
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Uniform Commercial Code, § 70A-3-504, Utah Code (1965); §
70A-3-507, Utah Code (1965).
Also

annexed

hereto

are

the

following

additional

Appendices:
Appendix B:

Order Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order

Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New
Trial or to Correct Order, and

Directing Defendant to Redraft

Original Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant.
Appendix C:

Order Granting Summary Judgment and Denying

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appendix D:

Holt Deposition, page 22.

Appendix E:

Earnest money agreement.

Appendix F.

Holt Deposition, pages 10-11.

STATEMENT OF CASE

A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the Order Denying Plaintiff's
Objection

to

Plaintiff's

Order

Motion

Granting
for

Summary

Judgment

New Trial or to Correct

and

Denying

Order, and

Directing Defendant to Redraft Original Order Granting Summary
Judgment to Defendant, entered March 16, 1990, a copy of which
is attached

hereto as Appendix B, and also from the Order

Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for
- 7 -
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Summary Judgment, entered the same date and attached as Appendix
C.
The complaint sought specific performance and damages
under

an Earnest Money

rescission

Agreement.

and damages

for

fraud

The counterclaim
and breach

of

sought

the same

agreement.

B.

i.

Course of Proceedings.

Initial proceedings.

("Krantz") sued

appellee

In September, 1986 appellant
the parties1

("Holt") to enforce

"Earnest Money Sales Agreement".

R. 1-8. Holt moved to dismiss

for failure to state a claim, based on the alleged failure of
her ex husband

(since remarried to her) to sign the Earnest

Money Receipt.

R. 12-15; agreement attached as Appendix E.

That motion was stricken at Holt's own request.

R. 21.

Holt answered, denying nearly every allegation of the
complaint.

R. 22-27.

She also counterclaimed, alleging various

misrepresentations and breach of contract by Krantz.
Holt moved to compel discovery

R. 26-29.

in November, 1987, but this

motion was also later stricken at her own request.

R. 37, 62.

Further discovery was conducted.
On October 2, 1990 trial was scheduled to commence on
January 31, 1990. R. 111. But Holt moved for summary judgment
the same day.

R. 82-110.

The motion suggested

- 8-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the

complaint should be dismissed because Holt's husband did not
sign

the

agreement/

Krantz's

check

was

allegedly

bad, and

closing did not occur by the date mentioned in the agreement.
Krantz also moved for summary judgment as to both his own
complaint and Holt's counterclaim.

R. 114-116.

The cross

motions were briefed, and were argued to the court December 19,
1989.

R. 145.

The depositions of the parties as well as

Herbert Holzier (a witness) were published.

ii.
was held.

Disposition at trial (summary judgment).

was

trial

Improperly resolving a factual dispute, the trial

court found on summary
check

No

dishonored.

judgment that the S500 earnest money
This, said

the court,

constituted

failure of consideration.
The court also found that Holt's ex-husband failed to
approve the sale in writing, although the necessity of a writing
was disputed.

This alleged failure, and the "bad" check were

held to be substantial violations of the agreement and valid
excuses not to convey the property.
The court further found that scheduling the closing for a
day

later

than

that contemplated

by

the agreement was not

sufficient alone to excuse Holt from the sale.

R. 145 (minute

entry dated December 26, 1989).
Holt's counsel drafted and submitted to the court

a

proposed "Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
- 9 -
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and

Denying

187-191*

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment."

R.

The purported summary judgment contained "Findings of

Fact" and "Conclusions of Law."

Id.

Krantz objected to the

proposed order, and simultaneously moved for a new trial or to
correct the order on January 11, 1990.

iii.

New orders and judgment.

R. 154-178.

By minute entry January

31, 1990 the court denied the motion for a new trial or to
correct the judgment.

R. 192.

Holt's counsel was ordered to

redraft the order, however, to omit the Findings of Fact.

Two

new orders were drafted, and were signed by the court March 16,
1990.

Appendices B and C hereto.
a.

"Order

Denying

They are:

Plaintiff's

Objection

to

Order

Granting Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for a
New

Trial

or

to Correct

Order, and Directing Defendant to

Redraft Original Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant."
This document "denied" Krantz's objections to the original order
and his motion for a new trial or to correct the order, but
requires Holt to submit a new order, omitting the Findings of
Fact.

The

comprehend.
b.

last

paragraph

of

the

order

is

difficult

to

Appendix B, R. 194-195.
"Order

Granting

Defendant's

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment."
This document summarily dismisses the complaint and grants to
Holt
- 10 -
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the relief sought in her counterclaim for recision
[sic] of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement based
upon the failure of consideration tendered by the
Plaintiff in the form of a personal check, which
was dishonored; violation of the Statute of Frauds;
and, when coupled with the failure of consideration
and violation of the Statute of Frauds, on the
further ground that the closing was not timely.
Appendix B, R. 196-197.

Holt was granted her costs.

Krantz

suggests that necessary to this order were factual findings by
the court, including that the check was dishonored.
Krantz filed his Notice of Appeal April 16, 1990, and it
was received by this Court on April 25th.
Krantz

filed

enlarging

with

the

Court

a

On June 11, 1990

stipulation

of

the parties

the time within which to file this brief to and

including June 21, 1990.

C.

i.
earnest

Relevant Pacts

Earnest money payment.

money

agreement,

The parties entered into an

pursuant

to which

purchase from Holt a residence in Bountiful.

Krantz

was

to

R. 85; 118.

As

earnest money, Krantz present to Holt a $500 check.

Id.

The

check was never formally presented to the bank, however Holt
alleges (and Krantz disputes) that she contacted the bank more
than once and was told it would not clear.
whether

The parties dispute

it would have been honored by the bank if properly

presented.

R. 85-86; 118-119.

ruled that it was "dishonored."

Nevertheless, the trial judge
Appendix C, R. 196-197.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 11 -

Because Holt claimed the check would not clear if she
were to deposit it, the parties agreed that the $500 could be
included in the purchase price paid at closing.

Holt Depo. p.

22, Appendix D.
The purchase price of the home was set at $27,000.

The

low price was because it was constructed on unstable ground and
had been condemned by the City of Bountiful.

Krantz Depo. 25,

26, 32, 33.

ii.

Ex-husband's approval.

The name of Holt's former

husband Stephen appeared on the public records as a joint tenant
owner of the residence, however his interest had previously been
terminated by a Decree of Divorce.

R. 86; 120.

The decree

awarding the property to Holt had not been recorded, nor had
Stephen formally deeded the property to Holt.

The agreement

stated that the offer would be "subject to approval of Stephen
Holt by 8-4-86".
parties

dispute

agreement.

Stephen gave his approval orally, but the
whether

the

approval was

Closing date.

extended

the

The written agreement calls for a

closing date of August 20, 1986.
of

under

R. 86-87; 120-121.

iii.

event

timely

unavoidable

It also provides that in the

delay, closing

would

be

automatically

seven days, but not longer than 30 days, and that

"thereafter time is of the essence."
- 12 -

R. 94-97.
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The parties agreed orally to close on August 21, a day
later than the one mentioned in the agreement.
August 21st to meet her needs.

Holt selected

R. 119; Krantz Depo. p. 77. The

closing date and time were reconfirmed by telephone two and a
half hours

before the scheduled closing, and Krantz deposited

with the title company the full purchase price.
18-24.

Id. at 49, 1.

He appeared at the closing, but Holt changed her mind

and failed to appear.

Id. at 77.

She now seeks to avoid any

obligation to convey the property to Krantz.
On the date scheduled for closing, Krantz deposited a
cashier's check for the full amount necessary to purchase the
property.

Krantz Depo. p. 53-55.

with

title

the

closing.

company

for

The money was left on deposit

several

days

after

the failed

Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court ignored several genuine factual disputes
and inappropriately weighed the evidence in granting summary
judgment.

Holt's effort to have the judge make "Findings of

Fact" illustrates this abuse of summary judgment proceedings.
Holt's former husband had no interest in the property, and
neither the contract nor any law required that his approval be
in writing.

- 13 -
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The variations from the earnest money agreement were not
substantial, and were all waived by Holt.

ARGUMENT

I.

1.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

All facts are construed

in Krantz's favor.

No

evidence was taken, and the complaint was dismissed on summary
judgment as a matter of law.

As a challenge to summary judgment

presents for review conclusions of law only, the standard is to
review the conclusions for correctness without any deference to
the trial court.

City Consumer Services v. Peters, 133 Utah

Adv. Rep. 12, 13 (May 3, 1990).

All factual questions should be

resolved for present purposes in favor of Krantz.

Rule 56,

URCP; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 681 P.2d 1258
(Utah 1984).

If there are outstanding, genuine issues of fact,

summary judgment cannot be awarded.

II.

2.
dispute.

Whether

the

Id.

EARNEST MONEY CHECK

check

was

dishonored

is a factual

Yet summary dismissal of the complaint and granting of

relief on the counterclaim were
consideration

tendered

by

the

"based upon the failure of
Plaintiff

in

the

- 14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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form

of a

personal check, which was dishonored.

..."

Appendix C, R.

196-197.
Holt alleges that she "presented" the check at a bank on
August 5 and again on August 21, 1986 (the day of the scheduled
closing).

Ans. to

Interr. # 2, R. 99.

She alleges it was

"dishonored by the bank on both occasions/ and they refused to
cash the check."

Id.

She also claims that on two occasions

between August 5 and August 21 she called the bank and was told
there were insufficient funds to cover it.

Id.

However, Krantz had a credit arrangement with the bank
for payment of the check had it been deposited at any branch or
presented for payment
was.

in cash at the branch where his account

Krantz Aff., R. 116, 118-119.

And his account balance was

sufficient to cover the check even without using his credit on
various dates, including August 14 through 21.

Id. at R. 3.

His deposition testimony includes the following:
Q
On August 1, 1986, at the time you wrote that
checks, were there sufficient funds in the account
on which the check was drawn to clear?
A I believe so.
Q Do you know?
A Had the check ever been deposited, it would have
cleared.
I had an arrangement with the manager of
the bank, a long term relationship. My checks were
always paid even if it overdrew my account.
Krantz Depo. pp 36, 1. 19 to 37, 1. 2.
So whether
reach

the check was good

the conclusion

determined

that

the

that

it did,

check was

is hotly disputed.

the trial

"dishonored".

- 15 -
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To
have

a factual

resolution cannot be had on summary judgment.

See, Mountain

States Telephonef 681 P.2d at 1261.

3.

The judge relied on inadmissible hearsay in finding

the check was dishonored.

The only evidence of dishonor

was

Holt's testimony that some unidentified bank employee(s) told
her the check would not clear.

Ans. to Interr. # 2, R. 99. She

did not run it through any bank to find out.
The

claim

that

the

check

was

dishonored,

supported only by Holt's bald hearsay statement.

then,

is

"'Hearsay'

is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted."
801((c).

Utah Rules of Evidence

Holt testifies that a bank employee told her the funds

were insufficient, and uses that second hand statement alone to
try to prove the check was dishonored.
The supposed oral statement by the bank's agent does not
qualify as a "business record", nor does it fall within any
other exception to the hearsay rule.
story as inadmissible hearsay.

Krantz opposed the check

R. 119.

If hearsay were properly admitted on this point, Krantz1
hearsay statement of follows would also be admissible, further
creating a factual issue:
Q Have you ever asked your bank to verify whether
that check would have been honored had it been
presented on the dates that Mrs. Holt indicated in
the Answers to Interrogatories she had presented it
for payment?
- Library,
16 -J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
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A On one of the dates that she had presented it
for payment, they did say they would have cleared
it.
Q Who told you that?
A That was looking at my bank statement and also
talking with someone at Commercial Security or Key
Bank. I'm not sure who I talked to.
. . . .

Q What did they tell you your balance was as of
the 21st day of August 1986?
A Approximately $2,000.
Q Is it not true that as of the 5th day of August
that check would not have cleared?
A
No, that's not true.
If the check were
presented to my branch or deposited, it would have
cleared.
Q
Did that person that you talked to tell you
that?
A Did that person?
Q Yes.
A No.
Q Who told you that? Your friend?
A The branch manager at the time.
Krantz Depo. p. 42, 1. 18 to 43 1. 4;

4.

p. 44, 1. 16 to 45 1. 5.

Bolt agreed to have Krantz include the earnest money

in the amount to be paid at closing.

Krantz Aff., R. 116, 119.

Thus the contract was either modified, or she waived her right
to insist on strict performance of the contract.
court ignored this in granting summary judgment.

The trial

Yet it is an

undisputed fact in Krantz1s favor.
Q
What was discussed about the earnest money
check?
A
She (Holt) had told me that she had taken my
check to the bank and that it would not clear.
Q What was your response to that?
A
I told her that if she deposited it, it would
clear or if she wanted me to get her a different
check I would do that. She told me to just bring
it at the time of closing, which I did.
The
cashier's check that I deposited at the closing
included the $500 earnest money.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law 17
Library,
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Krantz Depo. p. 46, 1. 2 to 12.
Q
But notwithstanding the fact you hadn't been
able to cash the $500 check, you were still willing
to close as of the morning of the closing?
A I told him that morning that the check had not
been cleared or not been cashed.
Q What did he say about that?
A He would include it in the final.
Q Did you make any objection to that?
A No.
Q That was agreeable to you, was it not?
A That's fine.
Holt Depo. p. 22, 1. 2 to 12, Appendix D.

It is difficult to

imagine how, in light of the parties' agreement, the $500 check
could possibly be found to excuse Holt from her contract.

5.

Even dishonor of the check would not be a "failure of

consideration,"
Appendix B.

contrary

to

the

court's

ruling.

R. 197,

After improperly finding that the earnest money

check was dishonored, the trial judge then made a leap of logic
to

conclude

that

Holt's

performance

was

excused

because

consideration had failed.
The

term

"failure

of

disuse and leads to confusion.

consideration"

has

fallen

into

Calamari & Perillo, Contracts,

2d Ed. § 11-25; Restatement, Contracts (2d) § 262, Comment a.
This makes it more difficult to review the judge's holding.
However, the term seems to refer to a major failure to perform
by one side, which may sometimes excuse performance on the part
of the other. But,
- 18 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is not every minor failure, which could
otherwise
be
remedied,
which
will
justify
nonperformance.
It
must
be
something
so
substantial that it could be reasonably deemed to
vindicate the other's refusal to perform; and this
is a matter of affirmative excuse or justification,
which
the
party
so
claiming has the burden of demonstrating.
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (1975).
By offering hearsay evidence that she was told that
check

would

not be

while

admitting

honored

that

she

if she had tried

agreed

the

$500

the

to deposit it,

could

be

paid

at

closing, Holt has fallen far short of her burden of showing a
substantial failure of performance.

6.

Since

the

check was never properly presented, it

cannot have been dishonored.
ignoring

the

definitions

Yet the court held that it was,

set

forth

in

the

Utah

Uniform

Commercial Code.
(1)

An instrument is dishonored when
(a) a necessary or optional presentment is duly
made and due acceptance or payment is refused or
cannot be obtained within the prescribed time or in
case
of
bank
collections
the
instrument
is
reasonably returned by the midnight deadline; or
(b)
presentment is excused and the instrument
is not duly accepted or paid.
§ 70A-3-507(l), Utah Code (1965) (emphasis added).

Yet Holt did

not even deposit the check, but merely made inquiry as to its
acceptability.

"Presentment

is

a

demand

for

acceptance

or

payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by
or on behalf of the holder."

§ 70A-3-504 (1) , Utah Code (1965)

(emphasis added).
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7.

The earnest money was not the primary consideration

for the contract.

Appendix E.

The $500 is "given to secure and

apply on the purchase of the property . . . ."

11.

Paragraph

two provides that the purchase price is $27,000, including the
$500 and $26,500 to be paid at closing.

Id.

Consideration for

the contract is the agreement to purchase and sale the property
for

$27,000.

Mutual

promises

constitute

consideration.

Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc.,
706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985).
At best, Holt's claim is that the alleged late payment of
the $500

(less than two percent of the price)

purpose of the whole contract.

defeats the

Rescission is available only

when one party has committed a material breach which destroys
the entire purpose for entering into the contract.

Crowley v.

Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 854, 106 Idaho 818 (1984).
The court's award of restitution and rescission would be
proper

only if there had been a "material" breach.

Corporation v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449, 451 (1979).

Polyglycoat

It must be of

such prime importance that the contract would not have been made
if the default had been contemplated, or must defeat the very
object of the contract.

Id.

Had Holt simply appeared at closing as she had agreed
(and reconfirmed

that very morning, Krantz Depo. p. 49, 1.

18-24), she would have been paid the full purchase price.
money had been delivered to the title company.

The

Id. at p. 53-55.
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Failure of consideration occurs when a party, without his fault,
fails to receive the agreed exchange.
P.2d 617 (Utah 1984).

Bentley v. Potter, 694

But it was entirely Holt's fault that she

was not at closing to receive the purchase price.

See, Holt

Depo. p. 15, 1. 14 et seq.

III.

8.

APPROVAL OF EX-HUSBAND

Lack of Holt's former husband's approval was not a

•violation of the statute of frauds,"
held.

Order, Appendix C, R. 197.

as the court erroneously

In addition to "failure of

consideration", this "violation" was the court's other reason
for excusing

Holt's performance.

Nothing

required that his approval be written.

in the agreement

Appendix E, p. 3, K 7

("Offer subject to approval of Stephen Holt by 8-4-86").
Neither

the

court

nor

Holt's

memoranda

adequately

explains what section of the statute of frauds applies to the
above clause, requiring the approval to be written.

And Holt

cannot transform to her own benefit her tardiness in recording
her sole ownership to get the residence in her name alone, since
this failure does not bring the approval clause within the
statute of frauds.
The

statute

of

frauds applies only

to owners of an

interest in the property, and to a person who is "creating,
granting, surrendering or declaring . . . an estate or interest
- 21 -
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in real property."

§ 25-5-1, Utah Code.

Stephen Holt was doing

none of these things by approving his ex-wife's decision to sell
her

separately

owned

home.

So

the

statute

of

frauds is

irrelevant, and the court erred.

9.

The earnest money agreement simply allowed Bolt to

consult her ex-husband.

She had the option to terminate the

contract if by August 4, 1986 he advised against the proposed
sale.

Appendix E, p. 3, % 7 ("Offer subject to approval of

Stephen Holt by 8-4-86n).
Rather than exercising her option, Holt did obtain her
former husband's approval, and so advised Krantz.
Q
(By Mr. Barker) Prior to the time that Mr.
Krantz appeared at the title company to close the
transaction, did you ever discuss with your
ex-husband, Stephen Holt, whether or not he
approved
the transaction as contemplated by
Paragraph 7 of Appendix
2 (the earnest money
agreement)?
A Yes, I did.
Q When did that conversation take place?
A Approximately one week after the earnest money
offer.
. . . .

Q
What did you say to him and he to you with
respect to the matter?
A I said, nI have an offer on the house. What do
you think of that?" He said, "It's up to you."
Q
Is that the full content of the conversation
with respect to his approval?
A In a nutshell.
Appendix F, Holt Depo. p. 10, 1. 13 to 11, 1. 10. About August
10 (eleven days before closing) Holt informed Krantz she had
secured her ex-husband's approval. Krantz Depo. p. 47, 1. 15 to
48, 1. 5.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q
You were aware that the title report that you
had obtained did show Mr* Holt as a joint tenant on
the property, were you not?
A Yes, I was. But I was also aware that it was
still not necessary to have Stephen Holt sign
anything.
Q
This is based on this knowledge that you
testified on redirect and also back into direct
testimony?
A Yes.
Q This fellow at Guardian Title - A That, and also the fact that I was told by Miss
Holt that that was taken care of, and as of even
three hours prior to closing on the morning of
the closing I was told everything was fine, and
based on the fact that that was not one of the
reasons she gave me for not closing.
Q What reasons did she give you for not closing?
A
The only reason she gave me was Mr. Holzer's
involvement in the transaction or his alleged
involvement, which she believed it to be.
Krantz Depo. p. 78, 1. 25 to 79, 1. 21.

10.

Holt's ex-husband held no interest in the home.

his written

approval

is not

required

frauds. § 25-5-1 Utah Code, et seq.

under

So

the statute of

And the fact that Holts

remarried three years after the sale (Holt Depo. p. 3, 1. 23-24)
does not change this result.
case before the remarriage.

A lis pendens was filed in this

R. 116, 120.

Holts were owners of record in joint tenancy during their
initial marriage.

Both names still appeared on the public

record, which was the only reason his approval was called for by
the earnest money agreement.
4.

Holt Depo. p. 9, 1. 24 to 10, 1.

When they divorced in 1982 the home was awarded to Holt as

her sole and separate property.

Holt Depo. p. 4, 1. 4-6 & p. 6,

- 23 -
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1. 18-21; R. 120, 132-133.

All that remained to be done was to

remove his name of record by recording the divorce decree or a
deed.
Q (By Mr. Barker) Was there anything remaining to
be done other than your ex-husband conveying legal
title to you? That is, was there anything you had
to do before he was to do that?
A No.
Q What was the reason that he had not given you a
deed to the house at the time that you borrowed the
money?
A I can't recall a reason.
Holt Depo. p. 8, 1. 20 to 8, 1. 3.
A large insurance claim was made for damage to the home
due to instable soil.

Since Holt was the sole owner, the entire

amount was paid to her.

Holt Depo. p. 5, 1. 1-7.

Indeed, the

earnest money agreement itself referred only to Holt herself as
"Seller.n

Appendix E, R. 94-97.

Neither the agreement nor Utah

law requires that a person's advice from her ex-spouse must be
given in writing.

11.

Williams case does not apply.

Holt (and apparently

the trial court) relied heavily on one case for the assertion
that the contract is unenforceable for failure of her ex-husband
to approve of the sale in writing.
P.2d 432 (Utah 1986).

Williams v. Singleton, 723

To the contrary, the reasoning of that

case supports Krantz's position that the contract is enforceable
without his written consent.
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Williams is distinguishable from this case in various
ways, including the following:

i.

Holt is a sole owner.

In Williams the sellers were

married and each actually owned an undivided one-half interest
in the property.

Of course the court held that the signature of

both was required.
Here Holt, as a sole owner, had the freedom to sell the
property without the consent of her former husband.

The wording

she had inserted concerning obtaining her husband's approval did
not limit her unconditional right to sell the property without
his consent, but simply gave her the option to back out of the
transaction if he advised against the sale.

She did not try to

exercise that option, but rather obtained his approval.

ii.

Oral agency is not involved.

Williams held that an

oral power of attorney from one spouse authorizing the other to
accept the offer to sell joint property was expressly barred by
§ 25-5-1, Utah Code.

This was because the transfer (unlike the

approval here) would

create an "estate or interest in real

property", so it must be
subscribed
by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by
writing.
723 P.2d at 423, quoting § 25-5-1, Utah Code (emphasis added).
- 25 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Holt's ex-husband, on the other hand, was not creating or
transfering an interest in real property when he approved of the
sale.

And there was no agency required, written or otherwise.

iii.

Mutuality of agreement.

factor discussed in Williams.

This was an important

723 P.d at 424-425.

Here, since

Holt is the sole owner of the property, she could have prevailed
in

enforcing

written

the

consent

sale

of

her

contract

against

husband.

enforceable by Krantz against her.

Krantz without

The contract

the

is likewise

Her ex-husband, on the other

hand, had no right at all that he could enforce against either
party.

Why would his written consent be required?

iv.

Part

performance.

This

was

not

involved

in

Williams, but is here, as discussed below.

12.

The

statute of frauds is inapplicable

specific performance action.

to this

It provides:

Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel
the specific performance of agreements in case of
part performance thereof.
§

25-5-8,

Utah

Code

(1907).

So

even

if

the

ex-husband

consultation clause were somehow construed to create or transfer
an interest in realty, it need not have been written.

- 26 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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An oral contract for the sale of land may be specifically
enforceable so long as it is definite, certain and fair, and
part performance has occurred.
40, 269 P.2d 278
written.

The

(1954).

In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d

Here the contract is specific and

approval of the ex-husband, which is not even a

contract clause, is the only aspect which was oral ("It's up to
you").

Appendix

F, Holt Depo. p. 11, 1. 6-7.

The part

performance must be clearly referable to the contract.

Id. at

281.

Holt's

But

where,

ex-husband's

as

approval)

here,
are

the

contract

admitted,

performance are easily satisfied.

the

(including
elements

of

part

See, Woolsey v. Brown, 539

P.2d 1035 (1975).
Krantz's

performance

under

the

contract

included

the

following:
i.

He acquired the nearly $27,000 to close, and had it

ready for delivery early the morning of the scheduled closing.
Krantz Depo. p. 50, 1. 3-11, p. 54, 20 to 55 1. 16.
ii.

He signed a note obligating to him repay the money

to his lender.
iii.

Krantz Depo. p. 52, 1. 11-18.

The funds were left deposited at the title company

for two to three weeks.
iv.

Krantz Depo. p. 53, 1. 14-24.

He lost interest of

n

a couple of hundred dollars"

for the two to three weeks the money was on deposit at the title
company.

Krantz Depo. p. 56, 1. 14-24.
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v*

He lost a cancellation fee of about $75 on the title

report and of about $180 for appraisal costs.
vi.

He appeared at the closing, only to have Holt back

out, essentially at the last minute.

Krantz Depo. p. 77, 1. 18

to 78, 1. 1.
With such part performance, Holt may not excuse herself
by her own failure.

If a written approval was required, it

would surely be her duty to secure it.

IV.

CLOSING DATE
mmmoBamasnamsaBxsxsKaEBsac:

13.

The parties agreed to close a day later than was

specified in the contract.
used

for

not

conveying

R. 116, 126.
the

property

The third reason Holt
was

that

the closing

occurred on August 21 rather than August 20. The trial court
correctly held that this was "just an excuse not to close", but
indicated
excuses.

it

had

some

merit

when

combined

with

the other

R. 145.

The new closing date was by agreement of the parties, and
in fact Holt selected the date.

R. 119; Krantz Depo. p. 77.

The closing date and time were reconfirmed by telephone two and
a half hours
18-24.

before the scheduled closing.

Id. at 49, 1.

Parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any

or all of the contract, even if the contract itself says they
- 28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cannot.

See, Ted R. Brown & Assoc, Inc. v. Carnes Corp., 753

P.2d 964 (Utah 1988).
The written agreement calls for closing by August 20,
1986.

It also provides that in the event of unavoidable delay,

closing would be automatically
longer

than

essence."

30 days,

and

extended seven days, but not

that

"thereafter

time

is of the

R. 94-97, Appendix E (emphasis added).

Like the

allegedly dishonored check, the closing date variance was not a
"material" breach, either alone or in conjunction with other
alleged defects.

Polyglycoat Corporation v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d

449, 451 (1979).

V.

14.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE COUNTERCLAIM

The counterclaim should be dismissed.

Krantz moved

for summary judgment of specific performance and damages, and
for dismissal of Holt's counterclaim.

R. 114-116.

The trial

court should have granted the motion, since the parties had a
valid,

enforceable

earnest

money

agreement

bearing

Holt's

signature, and Krantz appeared at closing on the appointed date
with full payment in hand.
In

support

of

his

motion

to

summarily

dismiss

the

counterclaim, Krantz filed a memorandum including a Statement of
Undisputed Facts.

R. 112-113. Holt failed to dispute the facts
- 29 -
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as

required

by Rule 4-501, Code of Judicial Admin.

R. 138.

Accordingly, they are admitted for purposes of summary judgment
and the counterclaim should have been dismissed.

CONCLDSION

Holt failed to present the earnest money check, agreed to
waive any claimed dishonor and yet refused to close.
excused

that

refusal,

dishonored.

This

mistakenly

factual

finding

determination

the

was

The court
check

summarily

was
made,

despite Krantz's substantial evidence to the contrary.
The agreement allowed Holt an out if her ex-husband would
not approve the sale.

He did approve, however.

Holt failed to

get the approval in writing, and used this, too, as an excuse
not

to

convey

involved

since

the

property.

the ex-husband

The

statute

neither

owned

of

frauds

nor

is not

conveyed

any

interest in realty, and since Krantz fully performed his part of
the contract.
Krantz
judgment

requests

dismissing

instructions

to grant

that
Krantz's
summary

the

Court

reverse

complaint,
judgment

and

the

summary

remand

to Krantz

with

specifically

enforcing the contract, and dismissing the counterclaim.
Respectfully submitted this fifteenth day of June, 1990.

Ronald C. Barker
Mitchell R. Barker
Counsel
forLawAppellant
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"A"

APPENDIX

Determinative Authorities

Utah Statute of Frauds, § 25-5-1, Utah Code (1974); §
25-5-8, Utah Code (1943).

Uniform Commercial Code,

70A-3-504, Utah Code (1965); §

70A-3-507, Utah Code (1965).
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25-4-1

FRAUD

CHAPTER 4
MARKETING WOOL
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, £ 10-102.)

25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed.
Repeals. — Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L.
1931, ch. 54, §§ 1 to 4; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-4-1 to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of

wool, were repealed bv Laws 1965, ch. 154,
§ 10-102

CHAPTER 5
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Section
25-5-1.
25-5-2.
25-5-3.
25-5-4.
25-5-5.

Section
25-5-6.

Estate or interest in real property.
Wills and implied trusts excepted.
Leases and contracts for interest in
lands.
Certain agreements void unless
written and subscribed.
Representation as to credit of third
person.

25-5-7.
25-5-8.
25-5-9.

Promise to answer for obligation of
another — When not required to
be in writing.
Contracts by telegraph deemed written.
Right to specific performance not affected.
Agent may sign for principal.

25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or
in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning,
surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, §§ 1974,
2461; C.L. 1917, §§ 4874,5811; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 33-5-1.
Cross-References. — Contract for sale of
goods for $500 or more unenforceable in absence of some writing, § 70A-2-201.

Enforceability
of security interests,
§ 70A-9-203.
Securities sales, statute of frauds for contracts, § 70A-8-319.
Statute offraudsfor kinds of personal property not otherwise covered, § 70A-1-206.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Defenses to action on contract.
Easements.
Gifts.
"Interest in real property."
Leases.
Modifications of contract.
Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties
thereto.
Nature of required writing.
Option to purchase.

ANALYSIS

Construction and application.
Adjoining landowners.
Agent's authority.
Blank deeds or papers.
Contents of deed.
Corporate officers.
Custom and usage.
Dedication of land.
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STATUTE OF FRAUDS

v

25-5-1

.gntracts to buy or sell land,
executed agreement,
partition.
^rformance of oral contract generally,
.uvements and other expenditures.

tion for dismiBBa^ of the action. ILee v.
Polyhrones, 57 Utah 401, 195 P. 201 (1921).
A corporation cannot be held to be the agent
of or a trustee for a stockholder unless this section is complied with. Geary v. Cain, 79 Utah
26£, 9 P.2d 396 (1932).

,r> of money paid under parol contract.
. >v discharge and surrender.
vuve covenants.
. performance.

Blank deeds or papers.
Blank deeds which were executed before the
description had been placed thereon were void
and did not convey any interest or title whatever. Utah State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Perkins, 53 Utah 474, 173 P. 950 (1919).

^ x x . iption.

. tenants.
^ ..**;* construed together.
..auction and application.
^ meaning of the word "interest" in this
, ^ depends on statutory construction gov. ;>v legislative intent. In re Reynolds' Es*' Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270 (1936).
v>«a»ing

landowners.
^_. agreement between adjoining landv > as to location of a boundary line is not
. ^ statute of frauds, provided, among other
\ N-^ the location of the true boundary line
>. to be thus established is or has been
sxV^un or in dispute. But mere fact that the
^.. claiming title by parol agreement owns
j , vv#acent to the land thus sought to be con, s cannot and does not change statute of
.* requiring conveyance of real estate to be
, Aung, without regard to any uncertainty
^wLUvm of true boundary line. Tripp v.
,, - 0 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417

Contents of deed.
Where grantors sought to rescind a transaction because the name of the grantee of the
deed did not appear on the paper at the time
the grantors signed it, it was held this section
required only the signature of the grantor in
order to bind him to the transaction. Hanson v.
Beehive Sec. Co., 14 Utah 2d 157, 380 P.2d 66
(1963).
Corporate officers.
This section is applicable to agents of corporations, but the courts have adopted an exception when the person who acts under an oral
authorization is either a general agent or executive officer of the corporation. In the case of
an executive officer of a corporation an exception from the requirement of written authority
is based upon the idea that he is something
more than an agent. He is the representative of
the corporation itself. Mathis v. Madsen, 1
Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952 (1953).
Custom and usage.
Evidence of a course of dealing or of industry
usage and custom is not admissible to show
that real property used to secure one obligation
pursuant to a trust deed is also meant to secure
another obligation. Hector, Inc. v. United Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 741 P.2d 542 (Utah 1987).

1

, Jvining landowners acquiesce in a divide other than the true line, with knowl,» the location of the true line and with a
x and purpose of thereby transferring a
;•,' land from one to the other, such acquix „v alone will not operate as a conveyance.
\ ,. cannot be conveyed from one person to
^v^>. by merely changing possession, even
j, u>h such change in possession continues for
i v>\> V*Ti°d of time. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah
I' • V'O P- 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928).

Dedication of land.
Implied dedication of land for highway is not
within statute of frauds. Schettler v. Lynch, 23
Utah 305, 64 P. 955 (1901).

Defenses to action on contract
Under this section, fraud and deceit may
A|»vwt'* authority.
constitute the gravamen of an action, notwithv
\\ M ' at the time an agreement for the pur- standing that the breach of a contract within
llf|M%. sd land was entered into, there was no the statute is incidentally involved, and the
' j( ,mn requiring an agent's authority to con- statute in such a case is not a defense. But if
• ttt, \\w the purchase of real estate to be in the gravamen of the action is breach of an oral
))\\\+ the contract would not be invalidated. contract for 6ale of land, it is a defense al• V M>« v. Whitehouse, 37 Utah 260, 109 P. 2, though fraud and deceit are incidentally int'(l)jr- Ann. Cas. 407 (1910).
volved. Papanikolas v. Sampson, 73 Utah 404,
j H nil action for specific performance of a con- 274 P. 856 (1929).
,, j»v the sale of real property, held in abEasements.
/M *>f evidence showing defendant's agent
Where contract seller acquiesced to the relo', Mutliorized in writing to sell real property
, ,jui( it>s taking the case out of the statute of cation of an easement ditch, contract pur,Mj„, the trial court properly granted a mo- chaser's and defendants' oral agreement to
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25-5-1

FRAUD

move the ditch was valid even though contract
purchaser did not complete the contract, and
even though not in writing contract was
thereby enforceable against a subsequent pur
chaser from the landowner Lvman Grazing
Ass'n v Smith, 24 Utah 2d 443, 473 P.2d 905
(1970)
Right sought by defendants to maintain a
pipeline across plaintiffs land was an ease
ment and was required to be in wntmg in the
absence of sufficient evidence to support a finding of part performance under an oral or im
plied agreement Wells v Marcus, 25 Utah 2d
242, 480 P 2d 129 (1971)
Oral agreement to execute easement if a federal lease was acquired, but which agreement
was never put into writing or executed, could
not later be asserted as an exception to the
Btatute of frauds McKmnon v Corporation of
President of Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 529 P 2d 434 (Utah 1974)
Gifts.
This section has been applied to a parol gift
of land, where the donor exercised acts of exclusive occupancy over the premises during the
donee's occupanc>, notwithstanding that the
latter made improvements thereon, but not of a
substantial or permanent character Price v
Lloyd, 43 Utah 441, 135 P 268 (1913)
Under this section an oral gift or grant of
land can only be established by evidence that
is clear, convincing and unequivocal, more especially where the alleged donor and donee are
close relations such as mother and daughter
Nor will the mere making of improvements on
the land by alleged donee suffice to prove a gift
of the land Boland v Nihlros, 77 Utah 205,
293 P 7 (1930) (decided under prior law)

A parol lease of lands which has been fulh
performed bv lessor is not within the statute
Greenwood v Jackson, 102 Utah 161,12S P.2d
282 (1942)
Modification? of contract
Agreement altering or modifying an original
contract must also be in writing and subscribed Combined Metals, Inc v Basuan, 71
Utah 535, 267 P 1020 (1928)
'The words "as per agreement of 12-8-73*'
written on a check were not a sufficient memorandum m writing to modify a written contract
for sale of real estate and satisfy the statute of
frauds Zion's Properties, Inc v Holt, 538 P 2d
1319 (Utah 1975)
Jf the original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that
modifies any of the material parts of the original must also satisfy the statute unless a part}
has changed position by performing an oral
modification so that it would be inequitable to
permit the other party to found a claim or defense on the original agreement Allen v
Ktagdut, m P 2d £S4 (Utah \%%%)
Mortgages, and estates or interests of parties thereto.
Since a real estate mortgagor holds title in
fee subject to the mortgage lien, he has such
estate or interest in land as may be conveyed
only by written instrument under this section
Bybee v Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P 2 d 118
(1948)
Nature of required writing.
Letter from partners to partnership employee informing him that he owned undivided
10% interest in partnership satisfied statute of
frauds relating to conveyances of real property
even though it failed to mention consideration
and ^ a s otherwise not complete contract, since
all that is required under section is that interest be granted or declared by writing subscribed by party to be charged Guinand v
Walton, 22 Utah 2d 196, 450 P 2d 467 (1969)

"Interest in real property."
Where grantor sought to repudiate a deed
conveying land because of his incapacity at the
time of execution, and grantee orally agreed
that, in consideration that grantor would let
deed stand, he would pay grantor for life onehalf of the crops produced on the land, it was
held that the agreement was not one for an
"estate or interest in real property" within this
section Johnson v Johnson, 31 Utah 408, 88
P 230 (1906)
Oral agreement between a builder and a
landowner t h a t a building should remain personal propertj is not within statute, because
not involving the sale of an interest in land
Workman v Henne, 71 Utah 400, 266 P 1033,
58 A L R 1346 (1928)

Option to purchase.
Joint owner of land who had orally agreed to,
but had not signed, option to purchase was not
obligated to sell real property, and specific performance would not lie to compel conveyance
Eckard -* Smrtk, 521 P 2d &Z& W t a b \9>Vi)
Where option to purchase omitted mention of
oil or mineral rights, court properly admitted
evidence showing that defendant had leased
the oil and mineral rights to a third part>,
which lease had been ratified by the plaintiffs
Bench v Pace, 538 P 2d 180 (Utah 1975)

Leases
A stranger cannot avail himself of the requirement that a lease for more than a year
must be in wntmg, when the stranger is sued
by lessee for trespass Livingston v Thornley,
74 Utah 516, 280 P 1042 (1929)

Oral contracts to buy or sell land.
Mere oral agreement to purchase land from
another is within statute of frauds Chadwick
v Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95 P 527 (1906;
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Herschel Gold Mining Co., 103 Utah 249, 134
P.2d 1094 (1943).
Doctrine of part performance to take oral
contract out of the statute of frauds is purely
equitable in nature and has no place in an action at law. Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184
P.2d 335 (1947»
Where there was no memorandum reduced
to wTiting or no writing subscribed by the parties to be charged, but the deceased had accepted the consideration and surrendered possession, there was sufficient part performance
to avoid the statute of frauds and the deceased's heirs and successors in title and interest were not entitled to repudiate the contract.
Such an act would in fact constitute a fraud. In
re Madsen's Estate, 123 Utah 327, 259 P.2d
595 (1953).
Where plaintiff moved from another city and
took care of personal and business affairs of the
decedent in reliance upon an oral contract,
proved to be clear and certain, the contract was
removed from the statute of frauds. Randall v.
Tracy Collins Trust Co., 6 Utah 2d 18,305 P.2d
480 (1956).
Sufficient correspondence and part performance were reflected in record in unjust enrichment action to take oral agreement to
build house for $3,000 out of statute of frauds.
Jensen v. Whitesides, 13 Utah 2d 193,370 P.2d
765 (1962).
Advancement of $44,000 toward development of quarries was sufficient part performance to remove oral contract from bar of this
statute. LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson,
26 Utah 2d 158, 486 P.2d 1040 (1971).
Doctrine of part performance is not available
in an action at law for monetary damages for
breach of oral contract to convey land.
McKinnon v. Corporation of President of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
529 P.2d 434 (Utah 1974).
In a case where the existence of an oral contract for the sale of seven lots was admitted by
both parties, part performance in the form of a
down payment, two interest payments, and
conveyance of three lots was enough to remove
the contract from the statute of frauds. Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413 (Utah
1984).

purol executed agreement.
Whtli* no interest in land can be created.
nnimhTred, or surrendered by merely parol exwl il4irv agreement, a parol executed agreement bv a tenant to surrender leased premises
+ ** not void under the statute of frauds. Aaron
Holmes 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450 (1908)
s
Hniol partition.
I'ttrlttion of land among coheirs is not inefHuHvr, at least in equity, because made by
unit*), if followed by actual possession in severa l > of parcels into which land was divided
^Mltttmore v. Cope, 11 Utah 344, 40 P. 256
A parol partition between joint owners of
iv^l property, when carried out and followed by
urtuitl possession in severalty of the several
ium*lt, is valid and will be enforced notwithstanding the statute of frauds. Allen v. Allen,
{,0 Utah 104, 166 P. 1169 (1917).
l**rt performance of oral contract generally.
While a verbal gift or parol agreement to
v \m\t\\ land is within the statute of frauds and
M< lrt\N a nullity, a verbal agreement, if part
uci termed, can, notwithstanding requirement
vu statute, be enforced by court of equity. Price
v i.iovd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.S. (n.s.)
vs,0 0906).
iw H proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land
vu» \\w theory of part performance, a showing of
vKo making of valuable, or substantial, or benkiw\ii\ improvements by the donee in possesjkKui or the doing of other analogous acts which
\\vu\M render revocation and refusal to comm i t ' inequitable, is essential to enforcement.
1>KV \ . Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.
0< > » 870 (1906).
Otrt! contract by decedent to make will leavu ^ i>roperty to plaintiff in consideration of serv>Nv» to be rendered, was enforceable where
uUmiift' rendered such services as he was
vWWo upon to perform under contract up to
v w \>f death of deceased, and during which
H\»K> h^ was in possession of property by armn^nient made by deceased. Van Natta v.
K^wood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192 (1920).
1»» an action to quiet title, defended on the
f KWITW! that defendant had entered into an oral
vvittract to purchase property, it was not only
^KxUiibent upon defendant to prove a certain,
^ :v.t\ and unambiguous contract for the
vcvfc-ise of property, but also such acts in part
^•rkvciance thereof as in equity are consid^tve sufficient to take the case out of the statv^ ot frauds Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 Utah
y * * V P. 262, 33 A.L.R. 1481 (1929).
ive acts which are alleged to constitute part
KsHortaance must be in pursuance of the oral
xvtf:r*ct which it is claimed said performance
*»%*>. Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v.

—Improvements and other expenditures.
In an action to enforce a parol gift of land on
the theory of part performance, the improvements were not of such value or character as to
take the case out of the operation of this statute. Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8
L.R.S. (n.s.) 870 (1906).
In an action to quiet title, defended on the
ground that defendant had entered into an oral
contract to purchase property and had gone
into possession, making of small improvements
by defendant was held insufficient to take the
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or to comply with the terms of the contract, he
could, with the consent of the vendor, rescind
the contract and abandon all of his rights under it; and if this is done by any acts or conduct
which clearly manifest an intention to rescind
or abandon the contract by both vendor and
vendee, and vendor takes possession in pursuance of the parol agreement, then the rescission is complete and binding on both parties.
Cutnght v. Union Sav. & Inv. Co., 33 Utah
486, 94 P. 984, 14 Ann. Cas. 725 (1908).
An executory contract with respect to real
property may not be rescinded or discharged,
unless by act or operation of law, where neither party is in default, without some form of
written agreement entered into between the
contracting parties; but where there is breach
or abandonment of contract by either party,
the rule is otherwise. Thackeray v. Knight, 57
Utah 21, 192 P. 263 (1920).
A wholly executory oral rescission of an earnest money agreement to purchase a home was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.
Allen v. Kingdon, 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986).
Restrictive covenants.
Land which was included in an unsuccessful
petition for rezoning was not bound by restrictive covenants executed in connection with a
later successful petition, where the land, although rezoned, had not been included in the
later petition and the owner had not signed the
petition or document of restrictive covenants.
Gunnell v. Hurst Lumber Co., 30 Utah 2d 209,
515 P.2d 1274 (1973).
Specific performance.
In a proceeding to enforce a parol gift of land
on the theory of part performance, acts done
prior to the contract, since they are neither in
pursuance nor in execution of it, are never part
performance upon which to base specific performance of the agreement by court of equity.
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L.R.A.
(n.s.) 870 (1906).
An action to collect money due under a parol
lease is not an action in specific performance.
Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 Utah 161, 128 P.2d
282 (1942).
Plaintiffs who had made a down payment,
had completed mortgage payments, and had
paid special curb and gutter assessment pursuant to oral contract for purchase of realty were
entitled to specific performance. Woolsey v.
Brown, 539 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975).
Subscription.
A document to be enforceable under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
—Joint tenants.
Husband could not bind wife, who was joint
tenant, by contract to purchase the common

case out of the statute of frauds. Hargreaves v.
Burton, 59 Utah 575, 206 P. 262, 33 A.L.R.
1481 (1922).
In a quiet title action in which the defense
was that defendant was in possession pursuant
to a parol gift, evidence that defendant made
expenditures upon the real estate was not sufficient to take the case out of the statute of
frauds, even had defendant definitely proven a
promise to give her the property, where the
value of defendant's free use of the property
exceeded the amount allegedly spent for the
improvements. Moffat v. Hoffman, 61 Utah
482, 214 P. 308 (1923).
In an action for specific performance of an
oral agreement to convey the east half of a certain parcel of land which was made after the
written agreement in which plaintiff was to
have an undivided one-half interest, evidence
that the land was definitely described, that
plaintiff entered on part of the east half in reliance upon the parol agreement and actually
occupied a substantial portion thereof, and
made permanent and valuable improvements
thereon, all with the knowledge and consent of
the vendors, and that plaintiff paid the full
purchase price, was sufficient evidence of part
performance to take the oral agreement out of
the operation of the statute of frauds. Hogan v.
Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 P. 1097 (1925).
Pleading.
If the statute of frauds is relied upon, it must
be pleaded. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 Utah 577,
268 P. 562 (1928).
Recovery of money paid under parol contract
Where defendant verbally agreed with the
owner of real estate which was subject to a
mortgage to bid for the property in a foreclosure sale and to convey title to plaintiff for a
sum certain after he obtained the sheriffs
deed, and plaintiff relied on the agreement and
paid the specified amount to defendant who asserted ownership to the property and refused to
convey, it was held that a trust ex maleficio
arose, and was enforceable though the contract
was not in writing. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34
Utah 48, 95 P. 527 (1908).
Release, discharge and surrender.
Surrender of an interest under a contract for
the purchase of land could be properly effected
without deed or conveyance in writing in compliance with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51
Utah 234, 169 P. 745 (1917).
Mortgagor's oral surrender of his interest in
the land to mortgagee is within this section, so
as to be unenforceable. Bybee v. Stuart, 112
Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948).
Where the right of a purchaser under a contract for the sale of land was subject to forfeiture upon failure or refusal to make payments
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of a single transaction and entitled to be read
together to fulfill the requirements of the statute of frauds where the check contained a notation "V2 payment on land a6 agreed-other V2
payment when deed delivered" and the check
was delivered by the grantee named in the
deed to the grantor named in the deed who
endorsed the check and deposited it m his
checking account, the contents of the unsigned
deed expressly referred to the parties in question and specifically described the subject matter property, the deed was delivered to the custody of a bank a few days after the delivery of
part payment, and the named grantor acknowledged the propnety of the deed
Gregerson v Jensen, 617 P.2d 369 (Utah
1980)
Several writings may be construed together
as containing all the terms of a contract for the
sale of real property, notwithstanding that not
all are signed by the party to be charged, to
satisfy the requirements of the statute of
frauds, some nexus between the writings must
be shown, which requirement may be satisfied
either by express reference in the signed writing to the unsigned one, or by implied reference gleaned from the contents of the writings
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction, in which instance parol evidence may
be used to connect an unsigned document to
one that has been signed by the person to be
charged Gregerson v Jensen, 617 P.2d 369
(Utah 1980)

property since she had not signed the contract
nor given written authority to agent to 6ign for
her Williams v Singleton, 723 P 2d 421 (Utah
1986)
Trusts.
Where property was paid for with money of
the husband, and title thereto was taken in
name of the wife, a resulting trust arose, to
which the statute of frauds did not applj Anderson v Cercone, 54 Utah 345, 180 P 586
(1919)
A trust in real property must be created by a
writing signed by the settlor or his agent
Sundquist v Sundquist, 639 P 2d 181 (Utah
1981)
Wills.
Where a will is sought to be maintained also
as a contract, it must satisfy the statute of
frauds Ward v Ward, 96 Utah 263, 85 P.2d
635 (1938) (decided under prior law)
Writings construed together.
Several writings may be construed together
as containing all the terms of a contract,
though only one is signed by the party to be
charged, therefore, a written instrument containing an offer to exchange properties, but too
indefinite as to terms to satisfy this statute,
and signed by only one party, may be construed with deeds subsequently executed and
placed in escrow by both parties, for the purpose of establishing a valid agreement within
the statute of frauds, where the deeds were executed before the attempted withdrawal of the
offer by the party who signed it Miller v Hancock, 67 Utah 202, 246 P 949 (1926)
A check and an unsigned deed were evidence

Cited in Murray v State, 737 P2d 1000
(Utah 1987), O I C , Inc v Wilcox, 738 P2d
630 (Utah 1987)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Doctrine of Part
Performance as Applied to Oral Land Contracts m Utah, 9 Utah L Rev 91
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9 Utah L Rev 978
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Frauds §§ 44-128
A.L.R. — Price fixed m contract violating
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on quantum meruit, 21 ALR3d 9
Applicability of statute of frauds to agreement to rescind contract for sale of land, 42
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statute of frauds, 56 A L R 3d 1037
Exceptions to rule that oral gifts of land are
unenforceable under statute of frauds, 83
ALR3d 1294
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Oil and gas royalty as real or personal property, 56 A L R 4th 539
Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of «=>
55-80
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25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected.
Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers
of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part
performance thereof.
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2477;
C.L. 1917, § 5824; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
33-5-8.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Estoppel
Husband and wife.
Part performance.
—In general.
—Established.
—Not established.
Specific performance.
Estoppel.
Where prospective purchaser wished to buy
property from the defendant and defendant
said that he would sign a contract for the sale
of the property but he did not do so, no estoppel
in pais was established. Under the facts the
plaintiff could not make a case of equitable estoppel since the oral representations of the defendant that he would complete the negotiations constituted nothing more than a promise
as to future conduct, not a representation as to
a material and existing fact nor the expression
of an intent to abandon an existing right.
Ravanno v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570
(1953).
An estoppel will not arise simply because of
a breach of promise as to future conduct or because of a disappointment of expectations on
an executory agreement. Ravarino v. Price,
123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953).
Husband and wife.
Finding that husband and wife had orally
agreed to deliver marketable title of land to
plaintiff was not supported by the evidence,
since wife had never been consulted about the
matter at all, and there was no evidence that
she had agreed to anything. Holmgren Bros. v.
Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975).
Part performance.
—In general.
If plaintiff relies upon a parol contract of
sale, the first essential is to establish the contract by competent evidence. In order to make
possession available as part performance, it
must appear that it was given or taken in pursuance of a parol contract proven; such possession must be notorious, exclusive, and of the
very tract of land which was subject of the con-

tract. This possession must be established
without qualification or doubt. Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915).
Merely making improvements will not alone
take an oral contract out of the statute of
frauds. Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502
(1929).
The doctrine of part performance is to be applied with great care, paying particular attention to the policy expressed in the statute of
frauds and historical precedent where the
limits have been defined by the process of inclusion and exclusion. It is not intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only to prevent
its being made the means of perpetrating a
fraud. In order that a person may be permitted
to give evidence of a contract not in writing,
and which is in the very teeth of the statute,
and a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish in equity by clear and positive proof,
acts and things done in pursuance and on account thereof, exclusively referable thereto,
and which take it out of the operation of the
statute. Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260
P.2d 570 (1953).
Where the existence of the oral contract is
established by an admission of the party resisting specific performance or by competent evidence independent of the acts of part performance, the requirement that the acts of part
performance must be exclusively referable to
the oral contract is satisfied In re Roth'6 Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269 P.2d 278 (1954).
Purchaser of land under an oral contract
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the
doctrine of part performance, based upon his
possession of the land and improvements
thereon, must establish that the possession
was actual, open, exclusive and with the
seller's consent; improvements made were substantial, valuable and beneficial; a valuable
consideration was given in exchange for the
conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively referable to the contract. Coleman v.
Dillman, 624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
To meet the part performance exception to
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral contract must be established by clear and definite
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

in presenting a note for payment was a ques-

tion of law for the court Durnell v. Sowden
(1887) 5 U 216,14 P 334

70A-3-504. How presentment made.
(1) Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the
maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the
holder.
(2) Presentment may be made
(a)
by mail, in which event the time of presentment is determined by the time of receipt of the mail; or
(b) through a clearinghouse; or
(c)
at the place of acceptance or payment specified in the instrument or if there be none at the place of business or residence
of the party to accept or pay. If neither the party to accept
or pay nor anyone authorized to act for him is present or
accessible at such place presentment is excused.
(3) It may be made
(a)
to any one of two or more makers, acceptors, drawees or
other payors; or
(b) to any person who has authority to make or refuse the acceptance or payment.
(4) A draft accepted or a note made payable at a bank in the United
States must be presented at such bank.
(5) In the cases described in section 70A-4-210 presentment may be
made in the manner and with the result stated in that section.
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 3-504.
« ross- e erences.
mnA n Jnn
Acceptance varying draft, 70A-3-412.
Collecting bank, presentment by notice of
item not payable by, through, or at a bank,
70A-4-210.
Presentment, notice of dishonor and proneceSSary
0r
™A\™
Permisslble'
p

lUA-O-OUl.

and drawee bank's statement that check had
been drawn against uncollected funds did not
constitute a dishonor amounting to a failure
Estate of Kohlhepp v.
o f cons i d eration
M a s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) 25 U 2d 155, 478 P 2d 339.
Collateral References.
BiUg a n d N o t e s ^
m
m
40MQ5
10 CJS Bills and Notes §§169, 343, 358, 359,
ngj

OCA Qgg

^ n Y l SnT y *° W h ° m p r e s e n t m e n t i s
10 AmJur 2d 680, 806, Banks §§ 710, 838,11
m
A m J u r M 941
U„;xcus;dTelay, discharge, 70A-3-502.
' » " • » * « < * « K 890, 891.
Waived or excused presentment, protest or
^ j A # T. u
* ^ ^ . .•
*
notice of dishonor or delay therein,
Conduct of holder of check at tune of prenc\L
Q en
sentation for payment as affecting drawers
' UA " d " 511 '
liability, 4 ALR 1233
Presentment for payment.
What amounts to presentation to charge
Inquiry by payee's secretary as to whether parties secondarily liable on paper payable in
a check not yet endorsed would be paid did a certain town or city, without further specinot constitute a presentment for payment, fication of place, 39 ALR 918
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Place of presentment.
after exercise of due diligence, purchaser
Prior to Uniform Negotiable Instruments should have made a valid tender at place of
Law, it was held that where note secured by business or residence of maker. McCauley v.
mortgage was sold, and both payee and note Leavitt (1894) 10 U 91, 37 P 164, applying 2
were out of the state and could not be found Comp. Laws 1888, § 2851.
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70A-3-507

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 36, 171, 173, 174,
462
11 AmJur 2d 942, Bills and Notes § 892

Destruction of or refusal to return bill as
an acceptance, 63 ALR 1138

70A-3-507. Dishonor — Holder's right of recourse — Term allowing
representment.
(1) An instrument is dishonored when
(a)
a necessary or optional presentment is duly made and due
acceptance or payment is refused or cannot be obtained
writhin the prescribed time or in case of bank collections the
instrument is seasonably returned by the midnight deadline
(section 70a-4-301); or
(b)
presentment is excused and the instrument is not duly
accepted or paid.
(2) Subject to any necessary notice of dishonor and protest, the holder
has upon dishonor an immediate right of recourse against the
drawers and indorsers.
(3) Return of an instrument for lack of proper indorsement is not dishonor.
(4) A term in a draft or an indorsement thereof allowing a stated time
for re-presentment in the event of any dishonor of the draft by
nonacceptance if a time draft or by nonpayment if a sight draft
gives the holder as against any secondary party bound by the term
an option to waive the dishonor without affecting the liability of
the secondary party and he may present again up to the end of the
stated time.
History: L 1965, ch 154, § 3-507.
Cross-References.
Certification of check before returning it
for lack of proper indorsement, effect,
70A-3-411 (3)
Notice of dishonor, 70A-3-508
Payor bank, recovery of payment by return
of items, 70A-4-301.
Presentment, how made, 70A-3-504
Time allowed for acceptance or payment,
70A-3-506.
Time of presentment, 70A-3-503.
Collateral References.
Bills and Notes <S= 24-27, 217, 241, 252,
297, 385, 394

10 CJS Bills and Notes §§ 35, 36, 39, 184,
217,343,346,367.
n A m J u r ^ 943, Bills and Notes §§ 893,
894.
Duty of bank when several checks which,
in the aggregate, exceed the depositor's balance, are presented at the same time, 26 ALR
i486.
Liability of bank to depositor for dishonoring check, 126 ALR 206.
Rights and remedies of holder of draft
issued under letter of credit which is dishonored, 53 ALR 57.

70A-3-508. Notice of dishonor.
(1) Notice of dishonor may be given to any person who may be liable
on the instrument by or on behalf of the holder or any party who
has himself received notice, or any other party who can be compelled to pay the instrument. In addition an agent or bank in whose
hands the instrument is dishonored may give notice to his principal
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APPENDIX

Order Denying Plaintiff's Objection to Order
Granting Summary Judgment and Denying
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial or to
Correct Order, and

Directing Defendant

to Redraft Original Order Granting
Summary Judgment to Defendant
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WENDELL E. BENNETT (0287)
Attorney at Law
Attorney for Defendant
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7846

A£

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-—oooOooo
RANDY KRANTZ,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
OBJECTION TO ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL OR TO CORRECT ORDER,
AND DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO
REDRAFT ORIGINAL ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TO DEFENDANT

Plaintiff,
vs.
KATHY HOLT,
Defendant.

Civil No. 40041
Judge Cornaby
oooOooo
The Plaintiff,
Minute

having

filed an

objection

to the

court's

Entry granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant and

to the proposed order submitted by counsel for Defendant granting
summary
order to

judgment, and
correct the

been submitted to
and the

moving the court
granting of

the court on

for a

the summary

new trial

judgment, having

memoranda of both

Defendant, and the court being

or an

the Plaintiff

advised in the premises,

now
ORDERS,

ADJUDGES,

AND

DECREES

objections to the Order granting summary
for a new

trial or a

that

the

Plaintiff's

judgment and his motion

new order to correct

the granting of
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FILMED

the

summary judgment is

denied.

Defendant, by

and through counsel,

is ordered to redraft the order granting summary judgment, but to
exclude therefrom, the findings of fact.
This order

has

treated the

Plaintiff's

objection to

the

order granting summary judgment and the motion for a new trial or
to correct the order as being directed against the court's ruling
on motions for summary judgment dated December 22, 1989, and also
the

Order Granting Defendant's

Denying Plaintiff's
27,

1989,

but

Summary Judgment and

Motion for Summary Judgment

without,

Conclusions of

Motion for

however,

the

Law contained therein.

mailed December

Findings

The

of

substance of the

and

court's adoption, by

the ruling on objection and motion for a new trial dated
29, 1990, the

Fact

order prepared by

January

the Defendant

without, however, the Findings of Fact.
DATED this

/T

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to
South State,

Ronald C. Barker, attorney for

plaintiff, 2870

Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 on this 28th day of

February, 1990.

Cj\rT\r\AKM0 J^r
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APPENDIX

"C"

Order Granting Summary Judgment and
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
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f <J_£h j,. r.,

CL£;

WENDELL E. BENNETT

(li.'li 'I

Attorney at Law
Attorney for Defendant
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7846

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
OC
.1111*1 KRAN1,1,,

'

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
'OTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

;

Plaintiff,

:

Civil No. 40041

KATHY HOLT,

Judge Cornaby

Defendant.
---ouuOuuu—The a b o v e - e n t i t l e d
parties1

matter was

nppocinq Mntinrr.

Im

wi J t ten mewuiandum, nn In u n l i i

heard b'.

nummar,
I'j,

I'nu

MM

TurHqmenl

depositiimb

uf I In ilpfend nil

. '

I.lie pJ a J rit i ± i

>' Holt, 1111r| a witness Hprhert
i i n J J s [ n l HI I i

i ill i n i

l^i i>

ruppr.rtfil

by

irl

hi

lt.i|.

Bennett, F,sq.
in

published

hi. antz, the

defendant

Hol7er, and havinq considered

11 n I I i 11H | I n I I |

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES

Defendant the r e l i e f

II

I In

Ronald t . Barker,

appeared on behalf of the p l a i n t i f f rtml Wendell I
-arerl in lelinlf

rourt cm

n l i i l l I I I III*

| r/ejiu b e b ,

t h a t Defendant i s e n t i t l e d

sought i n her Counterclaim for
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to

r p r i s i o n of

CI! A r m

the

Earnest Money

h greement base ::l mi i]:: • ::: :i :i the failure oi

Sales.

considerati : i 1 tendered

I lain tiff i i :i the for rn. c: <f a personal

check, whi ch was dishonored; \ :i olation

of the Statute of I rauds;

of the Statute of Frauds, oi :i t'i :ie fur tiier ground that ti: le closing
was not time I v
ni i

" 11 ni i f i •ii'iiiiiii ni I '|

The Defendant is also awarded
11 I hi I In

DATED this

J

I HI I hi I MI ni il

her taxable <

i | c i I I i I I it: o iredi ir e .

day of March, 1990,
BY THE COUI>*.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I

the

do h = xeby c e r t i f y

f o r e g o i n g "Or de .r

Miril

II nirii I

Granting

1 M f i m •' t\mi i

Defendant" G

Judgment ai id Denying P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for
Formhl

c

Ii i t kei"

; I I mi n^y

II

pi a i I!" i I III'

r IMP I n\\\\

"Motion for"

Summa i y

Summary Judgment" t o
"!!

i !

I I M l • 11- *--

Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 on this 28th day of February

2

nf
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EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT
Legend

Ye

This is • l*B»!ly binding contract. Retd '

-—'•«»" btfort signing.

m

REALTOR*'

GENERAL PROVISIONS
(Sect, ton s)

I N C L U D E D ITEMS. Unless excluded her em. this sale s ha '- .r- *
* *
»
* \ : ~ ~ L e- * * * r * • e• . - * - . J V ^ • ng
ng a»!r«Conditionmg and ventilating fixtures and equipment wate- K ea'e ^u.«h m appliances i'g^1 f . * ; ^ f « a^d bu = Ds bathrcx «« e-T* * a*
d-a.-w-tes
r
ods, window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds awmngs «nsie-iec te>evii;on antenna. %*ai> to-waM carpets *a.e 4*~r-e t ±_-i- * . # * age door
er and transmitter(s). fencing, trees and shrubs
I N S P E C T I O N . Unless otherwise indicated Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by
>n of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, size location, present value future value, income
from or as to (is production Buyer accepts the property »n "as is" condftion subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6 In the event Buyer des »res
additional inspection, said inspection shall bt if lowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Bi Iyer.
'.. SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seder ha; received no claim nor notice of any bu»ldmg or zoning violation concerning the property which
not or will not be rernedted prior to closing, (b; all obligations against the property including taxes assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances
\y nature shall be brought current on c before closing, and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditionrng and ventilating systems electrical system, and appliances
i be sound or in satisfactory working condition at closing
>. C O N D I T I O N OF WELL. Selle warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Sellers' knowledge,, provided' an adequate supply oi
•r and continued use of the well on * -ells is a> ithonzed by a state permit or other legal water right
:, C O N D I r i O N Of SEP I IC TANK. Seller warra' its tl tat »r ty septic tn ik servif »g the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge,,, in go o-d working order and
si" Il tas i 10 ki t owl edge of » n y needed' repairs and it meets all applicable government health and const, ruction standards
:

, ACCELERAT ION CLAUSE. No tatei than fifteei \ (15]I days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreemw n, but i tot less thar three (3) clays prior to dosing,
ti iJ tail provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts against xt>e property require th«
MM it of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sate of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rata and /or declare the entire balance dut in the
it of sale. If any such document so provides and holder dees not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after not^e c
waiver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notici
eller or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under 'this Agreement she" be returned 'to Buyer. It; is understood and agreed that if pro1 'ision;
MI * d "Due on Sa I e eta us* are set fc rt h in S act i o n ? her m i i, a I te r na i. * es a 11 owed her e i n aha 11 b ec o mi e n i 111 an d vo»d
B. TfTLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15} days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing, Buye
II have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract of title brought current with an attorneys opirwon. or a preliminary titl* repon on the subject property
ur shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine end accept If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to SeJIei
Seller's agent, within the prescribed ume period specifying objections to title Thereafter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure th<
K:t(s) to which Buyer has objected If sard defect(s) is not curable through Bn escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall 'be null and void at tl »e optio*
* * ,ft «yer. and all monies received herewith shall be retur r>«j to the respec live parties.
TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected, Setter authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a tiMr\dmd form ALT;
icy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Setter shall designate Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other thai
se provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrance's or defects excepted under the final contract of tale. If title cannot be made so insurable througl
escrow agreement at dosing, the eernesi money shall, unless Buyer elects to wa*ve such defects oi encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreemen
.11 thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge.
t
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. I f Buyer is to take title subjec i to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyet i i la .e ft m \ frheei • (15) day
rr Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior tc cios»ng a copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) atfectim
property Unless written obfect»on is 9'ven by Buyer to Seller or Seller s agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title Subject fo sue
se s I f o b j ec 11 o n 11 n ot t em ed»e d w 11Digitized
: h "i I he ti,
t e dHoward
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5-/-

D* ' i

-6L

he'eby Deposits with Brokerage
'.ONEV the
m o u n t p tf
>TMO\rv
the ttmou"Up

*»f
^

•i ^ / / n o

^ j j aUj£~*—tfltZAW/J.

-

Daiisrs (S ^ O C t S O

}.

. which i h i i i be deposited m accordance with a p pi»table Suite Lew

r) p |

Hiii-f ^ d b
Phone Numoer

O f PER TO PURCHASE

£>AEPTY DESCRIPTION

The above silted EARNEST MONEY n giver n tu secure a n d apply on the p u r c h a s e of the p r o p e r t y situates at

/S^/ f ^

*

JUb^OO^L ,
lAJO^^ft
in the City of
. County o*
dirt /mT T^T. * '
. Utah.
any restrictive covenants zoning regulations utility or other easements or ngms of way., government patents or Mb's deeds of recorc approved by Buyer
ince ¥viTh Sec11on G SBid propeny 11 more pan»cu!ar11 • described as

,

—

_

_,_ __

_ _ _ . _

_

_», ._.

; APPLICABLE BOXES:
VtPROVED REAi PROPERTY

G Vacant Lot C Vacant Acraage

ROVED REAL PROPERTY

D Commercial

I n c l u d e d ttnms.

C Other

%. Residential

_

D Condo

__

_ __.,. _

, _,

_

Unless excluded betow1 this sale shall tncfuoe all futures and any of the tiems shown m Section A if presently attached to the property

following persona? prope/ry shall also be included in thts sale and conveyed unde*' separate Biii of Saie with war ramies as to tuie

Excluded it arm

The folio wing itemss 8are specifically excluded from this *»>»•
-iJt!-

CONNECTIONS U T I J 1
he sewer ^ r c o ' - e c t e c "
UC tank 42< o n n e*. *ec

' ***'?

secondary system

..

Suf"
Buy *

"» - f * o -

^

_____

/ f t ^ ^ .^_

J ^ n g r e s s & egress by private easement

- 0* shaies
Company
fi
K " * ame^ra £> master antenna © p r e w i r e d
J^ a ca* j£j o '.ected

t*conne:tec
£? .* -<*» '*-:

_A~£****k<-

Se i te' represents thai the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price:
onecie^. C i t h e r
^ e i e c i n c u y ^ C connected

RJGHTS
£ } *-tgai

•f san'tary sN-ste^
die wate r
ate m ' *

___

C Other

fcrf-

Buve " a'

.

.

dedicated road *)S'pa *ed
t curb and guner
^ ^ u t h e r rights

.

„

. p i 1111 u ciosmg

iS *»fc a i not be f ur • ;s hed

•* and subject to Section 1 (tr* abo*e and I: below aciepts ii ir its preseni physical

jition e*cep*

J R C H A S E PRICE AND rlNANLJnJU

i ^e

*£2^L^.:
- _

Dollars <S A 7 , 6 0 0 ^ 2 .

&QC>&

representing the apprpximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at dosing.

-

representing The approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust devi

whicl i include:

Dprincipal;

Dinterest;

nou i e * t% aic contran or o n e i eitcumprence IL be assumed

_,» ,„ « % per an* tun i w tt monthly p*Y m f , " , I ^ "," '

by buyer, which obit gut ten » bears intei esi «
Otaxes;

Dinsurance;

, / _ i ,^Z .

which shad be paid as follows:

D c o n d o fees

Dother

.

•— —.

-

..... ...

— —-

_ ^ _

representing the approximate balance of »n additional existing mortgage, trust 'deed note, real estate contract or othe< encumbrances to be
t s % u m e d by 8 wye r,, w h i c h o bt i g at »o n be a i s i rue r esi a t,_,-_—___«_, % pm a' •» »ui i wn I i im, o n th I y pa y m e n t s o f 'I „.,__ _____ »..,
which include:
. _ _ _

Cprincipal;

Dinterest;

Dtaxes"

Dinsurance:

Dcondo fees;

representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a n e w . _ _ _ _ _

._.._—

,.,..,.

Doth#r

loen. to be paid as follow?" . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ -

_

Other

sooodi

TOTAI PURCHASE PRICE

»j* d e i u b j ect to 6 u ye r Q ua 1 i h/«n g f o r • n d 1 e n a i ng i n i t i t u 11 or g r a i 11 n g SJ» d esavm puon and " or ft ne n o n g B \ i ye'" a g i e e s 1 o ma k e a p p 11 ca 11 o n w i th m .srzn=a»
r Seller i tcceptanct of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligation end/or obtain tha new financing at an interest rate not to exceed _ — — — . . . %
Joes not Qualify for the assumption and ; or financing within
tton of the Buyer or Seller upon written notice

**—*"

"Bays afier Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, thts Agreement shall be voidable

agrees to pay *
^-^
towards Buve r s tota< *»nancing a ^ «. ^ - ^ . ^ j * * * ,..fc
^
1
Agreement involves the assumption ofDigitized
an existing
lo^n
or obliga
o r crLaw
me Library,
propen>J. Reuben
Sec'io*"Clark
f ihaLaw
app
r
by the
Howard
W. Hunter
School,
BYU.
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INSPECTION O* TITLE
In accordance w ^ ^ t j i e n G Buyer shall have the opportunity to mspec
t titte to the subject prop*
nor ic~fctaaing
,hai!"ta*.e title sublet to any e>ts:.ng restrictive covenants inciuomg conoonvmum restrictions (CC & R I) Buyer r has Z. has not reviewed-an^-corrooCC & R s pr»or tc s<gn»ng this Agreement
VESTING OF TITLE.

Title snail vesi m Buye* as follows

SELLER WARRANTIES.

In addition to warranties contained in Section C the following items are also warranted

Dns to the aoove and Section C shaii be iimaeo to the following

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS A N D CONTINGENCIES
ES.
rfied pnor tc closmc3 Jut

j -/^-

^ ^ A ^ V ^ T

/ T y / M i

This offer is made subject to ttie following special conditions a no or-contingencies whtrh must

Q^_ ><•*-*-*-.

LVMjupjL*\

U+-

f

^^S^^^^'^f A / i y i f

Yi^

C L O S I N G OF SALE. This Agreement shall be oosed on or before .
reasonable location to be designated by
subject to Section Q Upon demand Buyer snai! deposit with the Escrow Doting Office aM documents necessary to complete the purchase m accordance
is Agreement Prorations set fortn in Section R shall be made as of C date of possessions'date of closing D other.

POSSESSION.

Selier shall deliver possession to Buyer on _

GENERAL PROVISIONS.
nent by reference

. unless emended by written agreement of parties

Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sections on the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this

AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND T I M E LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE.
ave until H*QO
(AJJL/'PM) UMJfo
V
1ST M O N EY tc tr^ Buyer.

1

.19

ure of Buye1

pig

Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions Seller

to accept this oHer Unless accepted this offer shall laose and the Aoent shall return the

^~ | - ^ ^ D a t e

V

Date

Signature of Buyer

U

C ONE
IEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.
ECTlON Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing oh>r

(Seller's Initials)

JNTER OFFER. Seiler hereby accepts the foregoing o*er SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or \r\ the attached Addendum, and
ents said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance Buyer shall have until
:>fied below.

(A M . / P M )

. 19

to accept the terms

JL
t I > Sff

(AM-PM)
Signature erf Seller

K ONE:

Signature of Seller

/

rer accepts the counter offer
rtt accepts with modifications on attached addendum
. (AM-PM)
)MMlSSlON.

Signature of Buyer

Signature of Buyer

. (Brokerage)

The undersigned hereby agrees to pay to:
. as consideration for the efforts in procuring a buyer.

tmission of

Date

iture of Seller

Date

Signature of Seller

D O C U M E N T RECEIPT
ate Law requires Broker to furnish Buyti «nd Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures (One of the following alternatives must therefore
mpteted)
x 7
C I acknowledge receipt of a final copy /ft the foregoing Agreement bearing ail signatures
ATUR

S I G N A T j & l OF BUTE*

(AX^Z
**•<
Daie
C l personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing oil signatures to be mailed o n .
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Date
Date
19.

by

•ed Mail and return rece»pt attached hereto to the Z Seiif r ~ Buye* Sent by

o —%_ e t

JTHORITY C
3NATORS
It Buyer of S /
a corporation penne'sh p trust estate or othe/
rrants hi$ or he» authority to do »c anc to b«nd b-yer or S e i l f

y the person executing th/"~ <reement on «ts

}MPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS
This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties v>ti supersede* ano
>y tno all prior negotiations representations warranties understandings or agreements between the parties There are no ve'bai agr«tments which tnodify
his agreement This Agreement cannot be cnanged except by mutual wnnen agreement of the parties
OUNTER OFFERS
Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyef shall be m writing and if attached hereto shall mco'porate all the provisions of this
a not expressly modified or excluoed therein
EFAULT/INTERPLEADER A N D ATTORNEY'S FEES
In the event of default by Buyer Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as l»Qu»dstec
or to institute suit to enforce any rights o* Se4ief in the event o< defau't b> Selie f or if this sale fa«ls to close because of the nonsatisfacnon & any
ondition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue o' any default by Buyer) tne earnest money depos t
•turned to Buyer Both parties agree that should anther parry default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained the defaulting p*rty she l
>sts and expenses including a reasonable attorney's fee which may anse or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or tn pursuing any
rovided hereunder or by applicable law whether such remedy ts pursueo by filing suit or otherwise m the event the principal broker ho»d«ng the earnest
eposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred tc herein the Buyer and Se'ler
the principal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action The amount
t remaining eher advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court m accordance with state law The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaurtmg
II pay the court costs and reasonable attorney s tees incurred by the pnnctpal broker m bringing such action
ABROGATION.

Execution of a fmel reel estate contract if any shall abrogate this Agreement

ISK OF LOSS
All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing In the event there rs less or damage to the property
the date hereof and the date of dosing by reason of fire vandalism flood earthquake or acts of God and t^e cost to repair such damage shall exceed
•ni ( 1 0 % ) of the purchase price of the property Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees m writing to mpau or
lamaged property prior to dosing or declare this Agreement null and void If damage to property ts less than ten percent (10%) of the purchaie price
K agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair 9r\d replace damaged property prior to closing this transaction shall proceed as agreed
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY
In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to mter'uption of transport
ire flooc extreme weather governmental regulations acts of God or simitar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller 4hen the closing dme shal'
ded seven (7) days beyond cessation of such conostion but »n no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the closing date p'ovided herein Th^yresfter
if the essence This provision relates only to the extension of closing date
Closing shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments art signed
'ered by all parties to the transaction
CLOSING COSTS
Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half ( 1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee unless otherwise required by the lending institution Costs
jmg title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid b> Seller Taxes and assessments for the current year insurance, rf acceptable to th» Buver
>d interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section B Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves
assigned to Buyer at closing
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING
If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title title shall be conveyed by warranty dt^i free of defects ofier than
cepted herem If th.»s Agreement is fof sale or transfer of a Seller s interest under an existing rea' estate contract Sellef may transfer by e*ther (a special
t deeo containing Seller s assignment of satd contract in form suffoent to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the
•ting real estate contract therein
AGENCY DISCLOSURE
BROKERAGE
DAYS.

Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller

For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term ' Brokerage

shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate otf»ce

For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term 'days" shelf mean business or worxing days exclusive of legal holidays
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A

I assume because both names are on the

title.
0

Any other reason that you know of?

A

No.

0

Did you ever talk with your ex-husband and

request his approval?
MR. BENNETT:

Is this prior to the 6-4-86

timeline in Paragraph 7 or at any time?
MR. BARKER:

Prior to the actual date of the

closing that was scheduled at the title company.
THE WITNESS:
from you.
0

I'm getting several questions

Will you rephrase that?
(By Mr. Barker)

Prior to the time that

Mr. Krantz appeared at the title company to close the
transaction, did you ever discuss with your ex-husband,
Stephen Holt, whether or not ho approved the
transaction as contemplated by Paragraph 7 of
Exhibit 2?
A

Yes, 1 did.

0

When did that conversation take place?

A

Approximately one week after the earnest

money offer.
0

Where did 1t take place?

A

I can't recal I .

0

Who was present?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A

My husband and myself.

0

In person or on the telephone?

A

I can f t reca11.

0

What did you sav to him and he to you with

respect to that matter?
A

1 said, "I have an offer on the house.

do you think of that?*'
0

What

He said, "It's up to you."

Is that the full content of the conversation

with respect to his approval?
A

In a nutshel1.

0

Were there any other conversations between

yourself and your ex-husband concerning his approval?
A

I can f t reca!1.

0

Had the transaction contemplated by

Exhibit 2 to the Krantz deposition closed, would
Stephen Holt have received any of the proceeds?
A

No.

Q

Now, Paragraph 8 of Exhibit 2 to the Krantz

deposition indicates a closing date of August 20th,
1986.

Are you familiar with that?

A

Yes .

0

Did you discuss with Mr. Krantz some

alternate closing date?
A

No.

0

Was the closing date fixed at some date
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